In Defense of Free Capital Markets: The Case Against a New International Financial Architecture by David F. DeRosa

From the Publisher

Although significant financial crises world-wide — in Japan, Mexico, Thailand, Indonesia, Russia, and Brazil — have affirmed that the free market system is imperfect, no successful alternative to free capital markets has ever been devised. Nevertheless, many theorists are proposing that industrial nations together create a new framework for regulation — a new international financial architecture — using measures such as target zones for foreign exchange rates, currency boards, and controls on speculative trading of securities.

David DeRosa presents an emphatically opposing view — that less, not more regulation is vitally needed. DeRosa demonstrates that public policies have often been dead wrong in concept and application; that so-called controls generate indirect and unintended harmful consequences; and that aggressive intervention is no panacea, even in cases such as the collapse of Long Term Capital Management, the former high-flying hedge fund.

DeRosa presents a rousing argument for putting far greater trust in the markets themselves. He exposes the risks, market distortions, and huge, hidden costs that can result from governmental bailouts and proposed reforms. David DeRosa makes an important contribution to a debate whose outcome will determine the stability and prosperity achievable in an interconnected age.

Milton Friedman

[A]n impressive survey and analysis of the crises of the 1990s.

Nassim N. Taleb

[E]loquently shows how governments can use pseudoscience to disrupt markets and create additional financial risk and volatility.

Thomas S. Coleman

Important reading for all those interested in world economic issues and the future path of economic growth.

Details from Seller

• ISBN: 157660036X
• Publisher: Bloomberg Press
• Pub. Date: January 2001
• Condition:

Comments from the Seller: 2001 Hardcover Grade: D Catalog: Non-Fiction General Synopsis: 230 pages. XLibrary book with stamps and stickers. Because of the remarkable number of currency and emerging-market meltdowns during the 1990s-from...

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These positions must be tempered by the study of the countries that have suffered the sharpest reversals of fortune in the 1990s. These same nations had dangerous domestic financial policies in place for a significant time before they descended into crisis. Moreover, when crisis did erupt, the government's response often exacerbated their problems.

The picture of history that is being told by most, but not all, of the would-be reformers lacks the essential recognition that financial crisis is mostly homegrown, not imported, and that it is usually preventable with modification of bad financial policies. By analogy, one could imagine a large, complex telephone network that is subject to intermittent failures. The reformers have concluded that the problem must be with the master switching circuitry, the analogue of the international capital market, before having taken a close look at the subscriber's kitchen wall phone, the parallel for domestic financial policies.

The common denominator in practically every crisis in the 1990s was an experiment with a fixed foreign exchange rate regime. Fixed foreign exchange regimes are founded on the promise of currency stability. Some of them have survived for years and have basked in their apparent success. Yet so many have ended in spectacular turmoil that one has to wonder if there isn't an inevitable day of reckoning for all pegged exchange rate currencies. What is often misunderstood is that fixed exchange rate systems, in and of themselves, have the power to attract foreign capital, provided that they reflect an appearance of permanence. They incubate the buildup of massive disequilibrium positions in the foreign exchange and fixed income markets. The famous carry trade, in which investors have taken leveraged positions in stabilized, high-yielding foreign currencies, is one example. Another is the phenomenon of foreign currency denominated debt accumulation in countries with fixed exchange rates. Both are motivated by the illusion that the fixed exchange rate regime will be permanent. If the day comes when the market suspects otherwise, a ferocious adjustment process can take place at a moment's notice when practically everyone inside and outside of the country tries to dump their exposure to the local currency.

The '90s, far from being an indictment of the international financial system, are a striking reminder of how potentially destructive fixed exchange rate regimes can be. Equally striking is the fact that once broken fixed exchange rate systems were replaced with floating regimes, no further disruptions occurred.