| Preface | |
| 1 | Foundations | 1 |
| 1 | Meditations on First Philosophy (II and VI) | 10 |
| 2 | Passions of the Soul | 21 |
| 3 | On the Hypothesis That Animals Are Automata, and Its History | 24 |
| 4 | An Unfortunate Dualist | 31 |
| 5 | Descartes' Myth | 32 |
| 6 | Psychology in Physical Language | 39 |
| 7 | Brains and Bahavior | 45 |
| 8 | Is Consciousness a Brain Process? | 55 |
| 9 | Sensations and Brain Processes | 60 |
| 10 | The "Mental" and the "Physical" | 68 |
| 11 | The Nature of Mental States | 73 |
| 12 | The Causal Theory of the Mind | 80 |
| 13 | Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications | 88 |
| 14 | Troubles with Functionalism | 94 |
| 15 | Pseudonormal Vision: An Actual Case of Qualia Inversion? | 99 |
| 16 | Mechanism and its Alternatives | 106 |
| 17 | Mental Events | 116 |
| 18 | Special Sciences (or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis) | 126 |
| 19 | Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction | 135 |
| 20 | From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World | 150 |
| 21 | Finding the Mind in the Natural World | 162 |
| 22 | The Many Problems of Mental Causation | 170 |
| 23 | Mental Causation | 179 |
| 2 | Consciousness | 197 |
| 24 | Concepts of Consciousness | 206 |
| 25 | What Is It Like to Be a Bat? | 219 |
| 26 | Quining Qualia | 226 |
| 27 | Consciousness and Its Place in Nature | 247 |
| 28 | Epiphenomenal Qualia | 273 |
| 29 | What Experience Teaches | 281 |
| 30 | Phenomenal States | 295 |
| 31 | Two Conceptions of the Physical | 311 |
| 32 | Naming and Necessity | 329 |
| 33 | Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility and the Mind-Body Problem | 334 |
| 34 | Rigid Designators and Mind-Brain Identity | 341 |
| 35 | Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap | 354 |
| 36 | The Rediscovery of Light | 362 |
| 37 | Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap | 371 |
| 38 | Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem? | 394 |
| 39 | Explaining Consciousness | 406 |
| 40 | Conscious Experience | 422 |
| 41 | Sensation and the Content of Experience: A Distinction | 435 |
| 42 | Visual Qualia and Visual Content Revisited | 447 |
| 43 | Introspection and Phenomenal Character | 457 |
| 3 | Content | 473 |
| 44 | The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena | 479 |
| 45 | "Intentional Inexistence" | 484 |
| 46 | A Recipe for Thought | 491 |
| 47 | Biosemantics | 500 |
| 48 | Reasoning and Representing | 509 |
| 49 | The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality | 520 |
| 50 | Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind | 534 |
| 51 | Propositional Attitudes | 542 |
| 52 | True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why it Works | 556 |
| 53 | Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes | 568 |
| 54 | The Meaning of "Meaning" | 581 |
| 55 | Individualism and the Mental | 597 |
| 56 | The Components of Content | 608 |
| 57 | Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access | 634 |
| 58 | What an Anti-Individualist Knows A Priori | 639 |
| 59 | The Extended Mind | 643 |
| 4 | Miscellaneous | 653 |
| 60 | Reductionism and Personal Identity | 655 |
| 61 | Freedom and Necessity | 662 |
| 62 | Analogy | 667 |
| 63 | Can Computers Think? | 669 |