Mind Game: How the Boston Red Sox Got Smart and Finally Won a World Series by Steve Goldman, Baseball Prospectus Team of Experts (Editor)

• Table of Contents
• Forewords & Introductions

Table of Contents

Forewords & Introductions

INTRODUCTION: A BRAIN SURGEON WALKS INTO A BAR . . .

A brain surgeon walks into a bar after a hard day in the OR. He sits down at the counter, orders himself a cold one, and takes note of the big-screen television. It’s tuned to one of the popular forensic crime dramas that rule network television schedules. A medical examiner leans over a mutilated body in an alleyway.“

Take a close look at this entry wound, Detective,” the examiner is saying. “The bullet penetrated here, then turned his left parietal lobe into hamburger. Must’ve hurt like the dickens.”

The brain surgeon winces. “That’s completely inaccurate. He’s pointing to the wrong part of the brain. The bullet hit the right temporal lobe, not the left parietal lobe.”

“ No way, man!” shouts a man in a faded Detroit Tigers jersey two barstools away. “That ain’t no right temporal! They made the right call! I’ve been a brain fan since I was seven years old and I know! Up yours, buddy!”

Baseball may not be brain surgery, but that doesn’t mean that everyone is an expert on the national pastime any more than we expect the man on the street to know neurophysiology. Yet virtually everyone who follows baseball acts as if he knows what he’s talking about. This book is your insurance policy against being one of those people.

A century of sportswriters, broadcasters, guys in bars, and baseball men themselves have burdened our understanding of the game with half-truths and outright inventions. To take a few examples:

Leadoff hitters have to have speed.
Characteris more important than talent.
The more RBIs a player has, the greater his contribution to his team.
Some players hit better in the clutch.
Teams that hit a lot of home runs don’t win as many big games as those that bunt and steal bases.
Bullpen pitchers fall into two categories: regular relievers and those who can close.
The closer is the most important man in the bullpen.
A player who can’t hit but is an above-average fielder is just as valuable as a good hitter who is an average defender. One of the greatest myths of all was the Boston Red Sox curse. There was no curse. There was just a tradition of incompetence and mismanagement going back to 1919. Believing their own evasions, the Red Sox continued to assemble one team after another without ever using their brains or their common sense to address their actual flaws.

Since its founding in 1996, Baseball Prospectus has developed a reputation through its annual guide and magazine-style Web site as the nation’s foremost independent group of baseball analysts and pundits, breaking new ground in areas the game has long neglected: intelligent team design, objective player evaluation, injury-preventative pitcher usage, as well as dozens of other insights, many of which are now commonly utilized in the game, or soon will be. In the pages that follow, the writers and performance analysts of the Baseball Prospectus group dissect and explain the process that enabled the 2004 Red Sox to win their first championship since 1918. Week by week and in some cases day by day, BP considers the problems encountered along the way, both on and off the field, and reveals that winning a World Series is not just a matter of getting the big hits at the right time, but of having a plan and a rational worldview.

In short, the Red Sox finally got smart and won themselves a championship. Of course, getting smart doesn’t guarantee a World Series Championship, but it sure beats staying dumb and hoping one will find you by accident.
— STEVEN GOLDMAN