Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism by Robert A. Pape

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  • Pub. Date: May 2005
  • 352pp
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    Product Details

    • Pub. Date: May 2005
    • Publisher: Random House Publishing Group
    • Format: Hardcover, 352pp

    Synopsis

    Includes a new Afterword

    Finalist for the Council on Foreign Relations Arthur Ross Book Award

    One of the world’s foremost authorities on the subject of suicide terrorism, the esteemed political scientist Robert Pape has created the first comprehensive database of every suicide terrorist attack in the world from 1980 until today. In Dying to Win, Pape provides a groundbreaking demographic profile of modern suicide terrorist attackers–and his findings offer a powerful counterpoint to what we now accept as conventional wisdom on the topic. He also examines the early practitioners of this guerrilla tactic, including the ancient Jewish Zealots, who in A.D. 66 wished to liberate themselves from Roman occupation; the Ismaili Assassins, a Shi’ite Muslim sect in northern Iran in the eleventh and twelfth centuries; World War II’s Japanese kamikaze pilots, three thousand of whom crashed into U.S. naval vessels; and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, a secular, Marxist-Leninist organization responsible for more suicide terrorist attacks than any other group in history.

    Dying to Win is a startling work of analysis grounded in fact, not politics, that recommends concrete ways for states to fight and prevent terrorist attacks now. Transcending speculation with systematic scholarship, this is one of the most important studies of the terrorist threat to the United States and its allies since 9/11.

    “Invaluable . . . gives Americans an urgently needed basis for devising a strategy to defeat Osama bin Laden and other Islamist militants.”
    –Michael Scheuer, author of Imperial Hubris

    “Provocative . . . Papewants to change the way you think about suicide bombings and explain why they are on the rise.”
    –Henry Schuster, CNN.com

    “Enlightening . . . sheds interesting light on a phenomenon often mistakenly believed to be restricted to the Middle East.”
    –The Washington Post Book World

    “Brilliant.”
    –Peter Bergen, author of Holy War, Inc.

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    Biography

    Robert A. Pape is professor of political science at the University of Chicago, where he teaches international politics and is the director of the Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism. A distinguished scholar of national security affairs, he writes widely on coercive airpower, economic sanctions, international moral action, and the politics of unipolarity and has taught international relations at Dartmouth College and air strategy for the U.S. Air Force’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies. He is a contributor to The New York Times, Foreign Affairs, The New Republic, and The Washington Post and has appeared on ABC’s Nightline and World News Tonight, National Public Radio, and other national television and radio programs.

    Customer Reviews

    Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorismby Anonymous

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    October 13, 2005: Robert Pape's approach to Dying to Win is interesting in a variety of ways, including his heavy reliance on data, models and analysis, something often missing from historians of the Middle East. In reading the book, one gets the impression, however, that the author began with a conclusion and then worked the data in order to prove it. The conclusion or thesis of his work is that there is really little difference between Islamist suicide attackers and those of non-Islamic organizations, since what they share is an absolute nationalist commitment, coupled with a similar commitment to eject outsiders from their mist. The problem with this approach is that it relies on an analysis of suicide bombers only, as opposed to the movements, which spun them. Furthermore, Mr. Pape must take the position that for Muslims there are no nation-states and thus any non-Muslim presence in a predominantly Muslim land not only justifies the use of suicide attackers, but also provides enough impetus to get individuals from outside that country to join the fight and commit suicide. Nationalism, in this circumstance, would be based on loyalty to a supra-national Islamic state, as opposed to a more traditional country. Complicating the nationalist explanation is Iraq, where suicide attackers' often target and kill fellow Muslims, many of which do not support the occupation. In the end, the book is more interesting as a source of data and general methodology, than as a source of wisdom. It also illustrates how data, without sufficient context can be used to prove almost anything.

    Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorismby Anonymous

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    August 08, 2005: Obviously well informed, the Author suggests a novel and interesting approach to analyzing suicide terrorism from a statistical point of view in order to learn what we may from this new and scary phenomenon. For the first 100 or so pages, he delivers a generous share of often surprising facts about the wave of violence that is now sadly familiar in our lives, as well as very perceptive and generally incisive comments of his own. Unfortunately, this leads him to his 'Great Theory', and once he fully formulates it, the author will pound his points rather relentlessly and, sadly, at the cost of the intellectual rigor he demonstrated in the first few chapters. Be prepared for his parsing of the statistical universe until it serves the greater purpose of 'The Theory', as well as a rather shameless treatment of causality. Once the Truth appears, all arrows must be made to point in the 'right' direction. So, for example, suicide terrorism has nothing to do with Islam, we are told, because about a quarter of all recorded events were perpetrated by the Tamil Tigers. It doesn't matter that the first (and about three quarters of all) recorded events occurred in Islamic countries, or that they begun in the 1980's, which is to say contemporaneously with the rise of hard-core fundamentalist Islam, or even, as the author freely recognizes, that the Tamil's Tigers did explicitly copy the methods of their successful Middle-Eastern peers. No, it really has nothing to do with Islam. No references to Iranian children human waves used for clearing mines in the Iran-Iraq war, no, no conceptual connection there. As long as the political faction claiming the suicide attack is deemed secular (say, the PLO), the author is fully satisfied that it doesn't count as having anything to do with Islam. Even the clear correlation between the location of Western troops in the Middle-East and the apparent local appeal of suicide terrorism amongst the population, one of the authors strongest points, is given the accelerated causality treatment. He concludes, not surprisingly, that it is the presence of Western troops that is responsible, of course. It doesn't even occur to him that there might be a reason for these troops to be there in the first place. Maybe this was already a 'problem spot'? No, the author insists that the root cause of suicide terrorism is the presence of troops on the ground in Islamic countries. Considering that the US is being blamed for 'abandoning' Afghanistan after the Russian withdrawal, this is kind of funny. Didn't help there, it seems. Ah, but there were troops in other places. So nothing but a complete evacuation of all 'lands that the Muslims see as theirs' will do, I take it. Presumably, this includes parts of Brooklyn. So in the end, we are left with an interesting statistical analysis, many relevant point, and the nagging task to have to constantly remind ourselves that we need to interpret the facts for ourselves, as the author's conclusion is systematically, and some times comically, driven to demonstrate his 'Great Insight'. When one has the talent and intellectual abilities the author clearly demonstrates, as a reader, one should be able to expect a little rigor to boot. Not in this case.


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