War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics over Technology by Keir A. Lieber

From the Publisher

Do some technologies provoke war? Do others promote peace? Offense-defense theory contends that technological change is an important cause of conflict: leaders will be tempted to launch wars when they believe innovation favors attackers over defenders. Offense-defense theory is perhaps best known from the passionate and intricate debates about first-strike capability and deterrence stability during the cold war, but it has deeper historical roots, remains a staple in international relations theorizing, and drives modern arms control policymaking.

In War and the Engineers, the first book systematically to test the logical and empirical validity of offense-defense theory, Keir A. Lieber examines the relationships among politics, technology, and the causes of war. Lieber's cases explore the military and political implications of the spread of railroads, the emergence of rifled small arms and artillery, the introduction of battle tanks, and the nuclear revolution. Lieber incorporates the new historiography of World War I, which draws on archival materials that only recently became available, to challenge many common beliefs about the conflict. The author's central conclusion is that technology is neither a cause of international conflict nor a panacea; instead, power politics remains paramount.

Foreign Affairs

The title of Lieber's book is somewhat misleading, for the book is really a challenge to the view, still current among some theorists of international relations, that stability between states often depends on whether technology favors the defense or the offense. The mobility made possible by railroads, the use of firepower to hold entrenched positions, and the potential of tanks to lead a quick advance have all marked a shift in the balance between offense and defense. Reviewing a century's worth of conflict, Lieber concludes, correctly, but to historians not surprisingly, that the causes of war lie in politics rather than technology. He also finds that it is not the case that perceptions of offensive supremacy can make a difference, whether or not there is any basis for them. The problem with the book is that it is trapped by the framework of the theory it so comprehensively refutes. This is less of a difficulty with the chapters on land warfare, for which the theory was really designed, but results in a rather convoluted chapter on "the nuclear revolution."

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Table of Contents