Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era by Ronald D. Asmus, George Robertson of Port Ellen, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen (Foreword by), Lord Robertson (Foreword by)

From the Publisher

How and why did NATO, a Cold War military alliance created in 1949 to counter Stalin's USSR, become the cornerstone of new security order for post-Cold War Europe? Why, instead of retreating from Europe after communism's collapse, did the U.S. launch the greatest expansion of the American commitment to the old continent in decades? Written by a high-level insider, Opening NATO's Door provides a definitive account of the ideas, politics, and diplomacy that went into the historic decision to expand NATO to Central and Eastern Europe. Drawing on the still-classified archives of the U.S. Department of State, Ronald D. Asmus recounts how and why American policymakers, against formidable odds at home and abroad, expanded NATO as part of a broader strategy to overcome Europe's Cold War divide and to modernize the Alliance for a new era.

Asmus was one of the earliest advocates and intellectual architects of NATO enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism in the early 1990s and subsequently served as a top aide to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott, responsible for European security issues. He was involved in the key negotiations that led to NATO's decision to extend invitations to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and finally, the U.S. Senate's ratification of enlargement.

Asmus documents how the Clinton Administration sought to develop a rationale for a new NATO that would bind the U.S. and Europe together as closely in the post-Cold War era as they had been during the fight against communism. For the Clinton Administration, NATO enlargement becamethe centerpiece of a broader agenda to modernize the U.S.-European strategic partnership for the future. That strategy reflected an American commitment to the spread of democracy and Western values, the importance attached to modernizing Washington's key alliances for an increasingly globalized world, and the fact that the Clinton Administration looked to Europe as America's natural partner in addressing the challenges of the twenty-first century.

As the Alliance weighs its the future following the September 11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. and prepares for a second round of enlargement, this book is required reading about the first post-Cold War effort to modernize NATO for a new era.

Foreign Affairs

An early enthusiast of NATO enlargement, Asmus was a principal aide to Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbott during the Clinton administration. He has now written a detailed history based on State Department archives and input from nearly all the important participants. It is an impressive story of how Washington tried to reconcile the wish of the eastern European states to be part of a reunited Europe with Moscow's desire to be a partner of the United States. Over the years, the first enlargement of NATO gave way to a new partnership between the alliance and Russia, and then to a redefinition of NATO's mission. It is difficult to read this book today, however, without some melancholy. So much hope and passion among enlargement's champions, so many prophecies of gloom and doom among its opponents, and so much self-congratulation when enlargement came about with Russia's acquiescence — and later when NATO took on a major new role beyond the borders of Europe. Asmus gives a fair (and polite) picture of the fierce divisions within the administration, and he records the caution of several allies and the changes of mood in Moscow at a time when the alliance was deeply internally divided over the Yugoslav wars. But those wars are mentioned rather skimpily here, and NATO's role — without Russian support — as a substitute for international legitimization in the Kosovo air war is beyond the bounds of this narrative.

The portraits of the main actors are unfailingly diplomatic. American self-satisfaction is unquestioning. (Was it really George H.W. Bush who reunified Germany within NATO?) The missed opportunity of France's reentry into NATO is, of course, gently blamed on JacquesChirac. But in the end all we have gotten is a second enlargement that was smoother than the first and a collective endorsement of America's war on the Taliban and on terrorism. These achievements are merely symbolic, since the current administration has made it clear that, except for the British, allies are no longer needed. Thus the title of this scrupulous book could have been "Much Ado About Very Little." The explosions of September 11 have pushed old familiar landscapes into the darkness.

Library Journal

Asmus, who was involved in negotiations leading to the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO's 1999 expansion, provides a strikingly detailed account that spans both Clinton administrations. NATO expansion is of exceptional significance as a case study in post-Communist diplomacy. In 1993, President Yeltsin signaled that Russia would "not object" to Poland's NATO membership, but it took nearly four years of painstaking negotiations to pass the "NATO-Russia Founding Act" sanctioning Russian acceptance. In light of improved Russian-American relations and a second round of NATO invitations, Asmus's praise for Clinton's NATO strategy seems justified. The book's clarity and detail recommend acquisition by all academic and larger public libraries.-Zachary T. Irwin, Pennsylvania State Univ., Erie Copyright 2003 Cahners Business Information.

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