Before it was sunk off Cape Hatteras during the Civil War, the Yankee ironclad ship the USS Monitor revolutionized naval design. Written by a member of the team that discovered the wreck in 1973, this text describes the efforts of the recovery team to save her artifacts. Marine geologist Sheridan also explores the history of the ship, including her construction, her successful battle with the Merrimac in 1862, and her sinking later that year. Annotation ©2004 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
More Reviews and RecommendationsRobert Sheridan has been part of the Monitor story since the 1970s, when his research vessel first made sonar contact with the long-lost wreck of the famous Civil War ironclad and he collected the first identifiable artifact. In this book he combines his perspective of the Monitor's discovery and efforts to save her artifacts with an authoritative history of the ship that revolutionized naval design. Opening chapters discuss the ship's construction, her successful battle with the Merrimac in 1862 that spelled the end of wooden warships, and the Monitor's sinking later that year off Cape Hatteras. Comments from the secretary of the navy who spurred the building of the Monitor, the captain who engaged her, and the young lieutenant who survived the sinking add color to these historically significant events. Sheridan follows with a personal account of the discovery of the Monitor and addresses the issues of control over the wreck and its recovery. He also describes his nearly twenty years of lobbying to convince Congress that the Monitor's deterioration called for action. The book's final chapters chronicle the raising of artifacts from this national treasure. This is the first account to detail both the dramatic history of the Yankee ironclad and the extraordinary attempts to recover her.
| Preface and Acknowledgments | ix | |
| 1. | Ericsson's Struggles | 1 |
| 2. | Demise of Wooden Warships | 14 |
| 3. | Disaster off Cape Hatteras | 23 |
| 4. | The Search | 40 |
| 5. | The Wreck Is Discovered | 54 |
| 6. | Identification Questioned | 69 |
| 7. | Proof of Identity | 81 |
| 8. | Meetings, Meetings, Meetings | 93 |
| 9. | The Wreck's Environment | 112 |
| 10. | Site Testing | 145 |
| 11. | Is Recovery Feasible? | 162 |
| 12. | The Monitor in Crisis | 181 |
| 13. | Saving the Artifacts | 204 |
| 14. | The Engine Is Recovered | 227 |
| 15. | Recent Achievements and the Monitor's Future | 238 |
| References | 245 | |
| Index | 253 |
No story about the Union ironclad ship, the Monitor, can be told without first discussing John Ericsson. Rather than being an inspirational conception, the Monitor evolved in Ericsson's mind from facts he amassed during his extensive career producing engineering innovations, including several military weapons and other types of ships. As in other scientific pursuits in the nineteenth century, the engineering knowledge base was limited. Scientists and engineers had broad interests and a great diversity of experience and skills. They were far removed from the narrow specialists typical in today's technical fields. Ericsson's interest in naval warships expanded as a natural part of his vocation as a professional engineer.
Born in Sweden in 1803 (Peterkin 1981a, 12; Mindell 2000, 33), Ericsson developed an early interest in technology. His father was involved in mine construction and encouraged his engineering drawing skills. Even as a teenager, Ericsson provided drawings for a major canal project in Sweden and worked on the project as a surveyor (Hoehling 1976, 16).
Ericsson entered military service, as did many young Swedish men. Considered a well respected professional pursuit in the nineteenth century, the military offered the opportunity for technical training not available elsewhere. First as a cadet in the mechanical corps of the Swedish navy, and later as an officer in the army artillery (Peterkin 1981a, 12; Mindell 2000, 34; Hoehling 1976, 16), Ericsson furthered his training and experience as an engineer. His interest in ships and propulsion stayed with him throughout his career. His artillery experience provided knowledge of the capabilities of cannons and ammunition.
When he was twenty-one, Ericsson took a leave from the Swedish army and moved to London (Hoehling 1976, 16; Peterkin 1981a, 12). He wished to expand his engineering experience and demonstrate the caloric hot-air engine that he had developed. Although his engine was unsuccessful, he began a productive ten year association with English engineer John Braithwaite.
After resigning from the Swedish army with the rank of captain in 1826 (Peterkin 1981a, 12), Ericsson continued his engineering career in England. He patented many mundane and pragmatic devices. His air compressors, condensers, refrigerators, steam fire engines, and pumps serviced towns, mines, breweries, and other growing businesses of the early nineteenth century (Hoehling 1976, 17)
The newest form of ground transportation, railroads, drew Ericsson's attention. The Liverpool and Manchester Railway offered a cash award for the best steam locomotive design in 1829. Although Ericsson's steam locomotive, the Novelty, reached speeds in excess of sixty miles per hour, an amazing feat for the time, Ericsson's locomotive was beaten in the competition by a slower but sturdier engine (Peterkin 1981a, 12). The Novelty's high speed was a little frightening, and the public was still apprehensive about the new form of mechanical transportation that the railroads presented. Ericsson was ahead of his time with this invention, similar to his later work on the Monitor.
A few years later, Ericsson associated with two American entrepreneurs: Francis B. Ogden and a wealthy navy officer, Capt. Robert F. Stockton (Hoehling 1976, 18; Peterkin, 1981a, 12). Both men saw a future for marine steam propulsion. The steam propulsion of ships consisted of side wheel and stern paddle wheel systems. To Ericsson's military mind, and with his awareness of the increasing effectiveness of naval armaments and solid shots and explosive shells, the vulnerability of the side and stern wheeler steamers was clear. He realized that placing the propulsion system beneath the waterline would offer a great deal of protection from shot and shell, a concept he used later in his design of the Monitor.
Ericsson patented his rotary, or screw, propeller design in 1833. It provided ship's thrust below the water. He then built a twin-propeller steam tug for Ogden, named it the Francis B. Ogden, and used it to try and convince England's Royal Navy of the value of screw propellers (Peterkin 1981a, 12). Although he failed to win the approval of the Admiralty, he earned support from Stockton. Coming from a wealthy New Jersey family, Stockton was heavily involved in the development of canal and river transportation along the Delaware River and in the construction of New Jersey's railroads (Mindell 2000, 36). Stockton visualized the future use of propeller-driven steamers on rivers and, being a naval officer, appreciated the military applications of the screw propeller.
In 1838 Ericsson built for Stockton a small seventy foot, iron-hulled, twin-propeller ship called the Robert F. Stockton (Mindell 2000, 36; Hoehling 1976, 18). Within a year, the Stockton sailed from England to the United States. Transatlantic steamships were rare, so the publicity about the Stockton's trip created an American awareness of Ericsson's prowess as a naval engineer. Business contacts and associations formed through Stockton drew Ericsson to the United States in 1839. Stockton's initial attempt to convince the U.S. Navy to build a large propeller-driven frigate of Ericsson's design was unsuccessful (Peterkin 1981a, 12). In 1840-41, Ericsson found employment at the Phoenix Iron Works in New York City, where years later the Monitor would be built.
Stockton finally succeeded in his proposals to the navy to build a large propeller-driven frigate. In 1841, through Stockton's sponsorship, the navy contracted Ericsson to build a steam warship called the Princeton (Mindell 2000, 36). This was Ericsson's major contribution to naval construction from 1841 to 1844. In a practice to be followed later in the rapid construction of the Monitor, Ericsson supervised the subcontractors' manufacturing of the parts for the Princeton. The hull was constructed in Philadelphia while the engine was built in New York City (Hoehling 1976, 20). Many aspects of the iron-hulled Princeton were later repeated in the Monitor, including a multiple-bladed screw propeller, a direct-drive engine, and engine room blowers. Many of Ericsson's innovations were submarine to protect these essential propulsion systems from shot and shell (Hoehling 1976, 20; Peterkin 1981a, 13).
The Princeton's armament included two 12-inch cannons, which were the largest guns placed in naval vessels at that time (Hoehling 1976, 20). One of the 12-inch guns was designed by Ericsson and built in England. He called it the "Oregon," because of the early 1840s territorial question between the United States and England about ownership of the Oregon area (Mindell 2000, 36). Ericsson favored the United States in that dispute. A heavy cannon of wrought iron, the Oregon featured a breech reinforced with belts of iron rings that strengthened the gun against the lateral pressures on ignition (Hoehling 1976, 20). Shot from the cannon could penetrate four inches of iron plate or fifty-seven inches of oak (Peterkin 1981a, 13). A contractor, following Stockton's specifications, built the Princeton's second 12-inch gun. Called the "Peacemaker," it did not have iron rings reinforcing the breech (Hoehling 1976, 20).
Ericsson and Stockton successfully demonstrated the screw propulsion system in the Princeton. In 1843, the Princeton's maneuverability and speed were greater than the existing paddle wheelers (Peterkin 1981a, 13). Unfortunately, the Peacemaker damned the Princeton project when a demonstration of the Princeton's capabilities to President John Tyler and his cabinet members led to disaster in 1844. The Peacemaker exploded, killing Secretary of State Abel P. Upshur and Secretary of the Navy Thomas W. Gilmer. President Tyler was providentially spared because he was below decks (Mindell 2000, 37).
Stockton was not held accountable for the accident, possibly because he was a naval officer and President Tyler's friend (Peterkin 1981a, 13). Ericsson felt the navy unfairly blamed him for the Peacemaker's failure. He was never paid the more than ten thousand dollars that the navy owed him for his work (Hoehling 1976, 21), and he received no more government contracts. Although Ericsson was naturally embittered toward the U.S. Navy and the U.S. government in general, he obviously was impressed enough with other aspects of the country to become a U.S. citizen in 1848 (Peterkin 1981a, 13).
In the 185Os Ericsson again worked productively with the Phoenix Iron Works in New York City. He built the Ericsson, a 260 foot ship, to demonstrate the marine use of his caloric engine in 1854 (Mindell 2000, 37). Unfortunately, it sank within the year in a storm off the New Jersey coast (Hoehling 1976, 21). During this time frame Ericsson communicated with potential investors about his idea of a "sub-aquatic" ship with a movable battery system, which had many features later used on the Monitor (Peterkin 1981a, 14). Ericsson submitted his concept to Emperor Napoleon III during France's war with Russia in 1854. Napoleon never responded to Ericsson about the sub-aquatic war vessel (Mindell 2000, 38). Later, no documentation was found to substantiate Ericsson's claim, so arguments arose during and after the U.S. Civil War about who actually invented the movable battery turret.
Unknown to Ericsson, another inventor, Theodore Ruggles Timby, had conceived of a rotating multiple-gun turret or castle for harbor defense in 1841. He filed a written notice, or caveat, to establish claim on his invention with the U.S. Patent Office. The caveat mentioned a revolving metallic turret for use on land or water, so naval use was included (Farr 1997, 34). Ericsson indicated that he had thought about his concept of what would eventually become the Monitor as early as 1826, which was prior to Timby's inspiration (Peterkin 1981a, 13). Ericsson's financial partners in building the Monitor were apparently aware of Timby's patent, because they reached a financial settlement with Timby for the Monitor-class ships they built. The U.S. Navy, however, never officially recognized Timby's claim and did not award him any financial compensation on later Monitor-class ships built by other companies. Ericsson's ego made him resist any sharing of the credit for inventing the Monitor, and his publicity after the war prevailed. As late as 19O7, the Federal Court of Claims decided that Timby did not warrant financial compensation or credit for inventing the Monitor (Farr 1997, 36).
Ericsson continued his engineering pursuits in association with Harry Delamater of the Phoenix Iron Works until Civil War hostilities began in April 1861. On 7 August the Navy Department sent out requests for proposals for the construction of ironclad warships (Peterkin 1981a, 14). The U.S. Navy was poorly disposed, with less than one hundred vessels; less than one quarter of the fleet was steam powered (Mindell 2000, 26). No navy warships were ironclad. Moreover, the knowledge that the Confederates in Norfolk were constructing an ironclad warship from the hull of the sunken USS Merrimack gave much urgency to the call for Union ironclads.
Responding to the request for proposals, Ericsson dusted off his drawings and models of the sub-aquatic warship he had submitted to Napoleon III. On 29 August 1861 he sent a letter to President Abraham Lincoln outlining his proposal to construct a ship that later became the Monitor. "Please look carefully at the enclosed plans and you will see that the means I propose to employ are simple ... and so efficient too.... I have planned upward of 100 marine engines and ... mechanical and naval structures of various kinds.... I have received a military education and feel at home with the science of artillery.... These statements ... prove that you may safely entrust me with the work I propose" (Hoehling 1976, 42-43).
Ericsson was still wary of the U.S. Navy's criticism of him after the Princeton disaster, and he was defensive about what he considered unjust condemnation. He also realized that the navy would be extra-critical of any ironclad proposals that he might submit. Consequently, he stressed his background and capabilities in his letter to President Lincoln, hoping to avoid any early negative reaction from the navy. Unfortunately, Ericsson's plea to President Lincoln never made it through the bureaucratic channels for the president's consideration (Hoehling 1976, 44).
According to Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, a board of navy officers was appointed on 8 August 1861 to receive and evaluate ironclad warship plans that had to be submitted in the next twenty-five days. Called the Ironclad Board, its members were Commo. Joseph Smith, chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks; Commo. Hiram Paulding; and Capt. Charles H. Davis (Welles 1996, 18). Appointed chairman of the Ironclad Board, Smith was mechanically minded and experienced. Moreover, he was a close friend of Secretary Welles and had his complete confidence. Seventeen proposals for ironclad warships were received by the board, including Ericsson's Monitor design.
Consideration of Ericsson's proposal, however, was fortuitously and indirectly brought before the Ironclad Board after 3 September 1861, which was the twenty-five day deadline for submission. This turned out to be a stroke of good fortune for Ericsson. Cornelius S. Bushnell had been given the go-ahead by the Ironclad Board to construct an ironclad warship, the Galena. By chance, Bushnell visited Ericsson around September 9 to have him evaluate the Galena's stability. During the visit Ericsson showed Bushnell a model of his version of the sub-aquatic battery (Peterkin 1981a, 15). Ericsson impressed Bushnell with his description of his model warship and its "simple" efficiency, and stressed his ability to build the Monitor relatively rapidly (Hoehling 1976, 45).
Bushnell was so impressed with Ericsson's ideas that he took the Monitor model directly to Secretary Welles, who was in Hartford, Connecticut, preparing for his move to Washington, D.C. (Welles 1996, 18). Welles was so excited by the Monitor proposal that he acted immediately, in spite of the deadline of 3 September being past. Welles wrote, "I directed Mr. Bushnell to proceed immediately to Washington, and submit the model to the Board for examination and report. But, deeming the subject of great importance, and fearing the Board would be restrained by the limit of twenty-five days, I immediately followed, and arrived in Washington almost as soon as Mr. Bushnell with the model" (Welles 1996, 19).
After arriving in Washington, Bushnell contacted his two partners, John F.
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Excerpted from Iron from the Deep by Robert E. Sheridan Copyright ©2004 by Robert E. Sheridan. Excerpted by permission.
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