| Introduction | 1 |
| 1 | Knowing and acting | 1 |
| 2 | Unanalysable knowledge | 2 |
| 3 | Factive mental states | 5 |
| 4 | Knowledge as the justification of belief and assertion | 8 |
| 5 | The myth of epistemic transparency | 11 |
| 6 | Unknowable truths | 18 |
| 1 | A State of Mind | 21 |
| 1.1 | Factive attitudes | 21 |
| 1.2 | Mental states, first-person accessibility, and scepticism | 23 |
| 1.3 | Knowledge and analysis | 27 |
| 1.4 | Knowing as the most general factive mental state | 33 |
| 1.5 | Knowing and believing | 41 |
| 2 | Broadness | 49 |
| 2.1 | Internalism and externalism | 49 |
| 2.2 | Broad and narrow conditions | 51 |
| 2.3 | Mental differences between knowing and believing | 54 |
| 2.4 | The causal efficacy of knowledge | 60 |
| 3 | Primeness | 65 |
| 3.1 | Prime and composite conditions | 65 |
| 3.2 | Arguments for primeness | 66 |
| 3.3 | Free recombination | 73 |
| 3.4 | The explanatory value of prime conditions | 75 |
| 3.5 | The value of generality | 80 |
| 3.6 | Explanation and correlation coefficients | 83 |
| 3.7 | Primeness and the causal order | 88 |
| 3.8 | Non-conjunctive decompositions | 89 |
| 4 | Anti-Luminosity | 93 |
| 4.1 | Cognitive homes | 93 |
| 4.2 | Luminosity | 94 |
| 4.3 | An argument against luminosity | 96 |
| 4.4 | Reliability | 98 |
| 4.5 | Sorites arguments | 102 |
| 4.6 | Generalizations | 106 |
| 4.7 | Scientific tests | 109 |
| 4.8 | Assertibility conditions | 110 |
| 5 | Margins and Iterations | 114 |
| 5.1 | Knowing that one knows | 114 |
| 5.2 | Further iterations | 120 |
| 5.3 | Close possibilities | 123 |
| 5.4 | Point estimates | 130 |
| 5.5 | Iterated interpersonal knowledge | 131 |
| 6 | An Application | 135 |
| 6.1 | Surprise Examinations | 135 |
| 6.2 | Conditionally Unexpected Examinations | 143 |
| 7 | Sensitivity | 147 |
| 7.1 | Preview | 147 |
| 7.2 | Counterfactual sensitivity | 148 |
| 7.3 | Counterfactuals and scepticism | 150 |
| 7.4 | Methods | 152 |
| 7.5 | Contextualist sensitivity | 156 |
| 7.6 | Sensitivity and broad content | 161 |
| 8 | Scepticism | 164 |
| 8.1 | Plan | 164 |
| 8.2 | Scepticism and the non-symmetry of epistemic accessibility | 164 |
| 8.3 | Difference of evidence in good and bad cases | 169 |
| 8.4 | An argument for sameness of evidence | 170 |
| 8.5 | The phenomenal conception of evidence | 173 |
| 8.6 | Sameness of evidence and the sorites | 174 |
| 8.7 | The non-transparency of rationality | 178 |
| 8.8 | Scepticism without sameness of evidence | 181 |
| 9 | Evidence | 184 |
| 9.1 | Knowledge as justifying belief | 184 |
| 9.2 | Bodies of evidence | 186 |
| 9.3 | Access to evidence | 190 |
| 9.4 | An argument | 193 |
| 9.5 | Evidence as propositional | 194 |
| 9.6 | Propositional evidence as knowledge | 200 |
| 9.7 | Knowledge as evidence | 203 |
| 9.8 | Non-pragmatic justification | 207 |
| 10 | Evidential Probability | 209 |
| 10.1 | Vague probability | 209 |
| 10.2 | Uncertain evidence | 213 |
| 10.3 | Evidence and knowledge | 221 |
| 10.4 | Epistemic accessibility | 224 |
| 10.5 | A simple model | 228 |
| 10.6 | A puzzling phenomenon | 230 |
| 11 | Assertion | 238 |
| 11.1 | Rules of assertion | 238 |
| 11.2 | The truth account | 244 |
| 11.3 | The knowledge account | 249 |
| 11.4 | Objections to the knowledge account, and replies | 255 |
| 11.5 | The BK and RBK accounts | 260 |
| 11.6 | Mathematical assertions | 263 |
| 11.7 | The point of assertion | 266 |
| 12 | Structural Unknowability | 270 |
| 12.1 | Fitch's argument | 270 |
| 12.2 | Distribution over conjunction | 275 |
| 12.3 | Quantification into sentence position | 285 |
| 12.4 | Unanswerable questions | 289 |
| 12.5 | Trans-world knowability | 290 |
| Appendix 1 | Correlation Coefficients | 302 |
| Appendix 2 | Counting Iterations of Knowledge | 305 |
| Appendix 3 | A Formal Model of Slight Insensitivity Almost Everywhere | 307 |
| Appendix 4 | Iterated Probabilities in Epistemic Logic (Proofs) | 311 |
| Appendix 5 | A Non-Symmetric Epistemic Model | 316 |
| Appendix 6 | Distribution over Conjunction | 318 |
| Bibliography | 321 |
| Index | 333 |