Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century by Thomas X. Hammes

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(Hardcover)

  • Pub. Date: September 2004
  • 336pp
  • Sales Rank: 309,166
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    Product Details

    • Pub. Date: September 2004
    • Publisher: MBI Publishing Company
    • Format: Hardcover, 336pp
    • Sales Rank: 309,166

    Synopsis

    Col. Hammes discusses how the ongoing events in Iraq show how difficult it is for the world's only remaining superpower to impose its will upon other peoples, and cites other recent incidents of powerful military forces being tied up by seemingly weaker opponents.

    Library Journal

    Retired marine colonel Hammes maintains that modern warfare has evolved in four "generations," moving from the massed citizen armies of Napoleonic warfare to the apogee of firepower in World War I to the triumph of maneuver warfare in World War II. Finally, Hammes brings us up to fourth-generation warfare, or 4GW, from Mao to Vietnam, from the Sandinistas to the present. These conflicts show that superior political will can wear down a militarily superior adversary. A 4GW opponent fights across political, economic, social, and military spectrums to sap an adversary's will to continue fighting. Despite the emergence of transnational 4GW opponents like al Qaeda, the absence of a credible conventional threat, and past 4GW experiences in Vietnam, Somalia, and now Iraq, the U.S. defense establishment remains fixated on defeating a 3GW enemy. Instead of expensive weapons, we must, according to Hammes, invest in human capital, developing expertise in an adversary's language, culture, and history. Hammes offers a compellingly reasoned and supported argument that we need to reconsider how to defeat nonconventional threats to our national security. Recommended for military history and national security collections.-Edward J. Metz, USACGSC Combined Arms Research Lib., Ft. Leavenworth, KS Copyright 2004 Reed Business Information.

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    Biography

    A graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and a career Marine, Thomas Hammes has spent most of his twenty-eight years serving in infantry and intelligence assignments. Colonel Hammes is considered by many in the defense community as the foremost expert in insurgent warfare. He has written numerous articles on defense issues and has appeared on PBS News Hour and other cable and network broadcasts. He is a senior military fellow at the National Defense University. He lives with his family in northern Virginia.

    Customer Reviews

    Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Centuryby Anonymous

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    December 06, 2007: The 'Generation 4' warfare is not that new of an idea.Van Creveld alludes to it in at least two of his books as do some others. However this book is a very good read.On the other hand for someone totally uninitiated in military history and theories of warfare this book could be difficult.But my advice is stay with it the book is very worth while reading. I liked the description of the Intifada as a perfect example of Generation 4 warfare especially the disarming of the teenagers by letting them use stones only (not Molotov cocktails) thus leading to the Oslo negotiations and concessions by Israel. I also liked the example of Arafat on how not to do generation 4 warfare and screwing up much of the gains from Oslo. The tracing of the evolution to generation 4 warfare from Mao and Ho Chi Minh through all its variations is interesting as is the critique of the Pentagon hierarchical vertical command setup leading to the cumbersome non responsive defense against G4 warfare.The description of the horizontal simple networking command and control structure of G4 warfare system was very revealing.Those were the good parts of the book. However the lengthy soujourn through the G1 through G3 warfare those of us familiar with military history could have done without.Napoleonic war and the mighty attrition battles of Verdun and Stalingrad are gone and will probably never be repeated. However conventional war on the Guderian and Patton maneuver model will probably crop up again.G4 war is very dependent on terrain and cultural factors and probably will not be adopted in its pure form everywhere.The author alludes to that,but does not seem to recognize that technology does have its place in war still because G4 warfare can be effective but it does not win wars. Even Mao in 1949 and Ho in 1975 had to apply heavy doses of G3 war to secure their gains and consolidate them.Hence I did not give this book 5 stars.Technology while it has to adapt to G3 AND G4 war will not be eliminated.A very extreme (however not very likely) application would be nuclear bombing and levelling of Veziristan thus destroying al Quada virtually totally.Ah yes technology!

    Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Centuryby Anonymous

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    March 20, 2005: A lot of theoretical military science - a book that would have the most impact on anyone interested in history, military science, or international relations. The theoretical nature of the narrative may be enough to frankly bore the casual reader. That being said, I liked it a lot. I even did something I rarely do when I read - I took notes. I wasn't quite sure what to think after reading the 1st chapter or 2 and was afraid I was starting to read the rant of an unhappy officer. However, as I read more and more, I found myself thinking of military conflict in a new way, and found myself agreeing with most, but not all of the author's viewpoints. The parts that I did not like was the fact that he stated that the US military had lost the 'wars' in Somalia and Lebanon - 'war' is a strong word to use to describe something that was essentially a humanitarian mission to provide a prescence to protect human life, with no intention of staying in a long-term conflict, and in that respect, the US was not about to remain involved once they started to take casualties and it became a military combat operation. I waited for the author to return to that idea and explain those statements, but only vague at best arguments were made to support the idea. The author should have just left those references out altogether as he compiled enough case studies to make a compelling argument without their use. The chapter on the al-Aqsa intifada also sort of wandered around without conclusion for awhile. As I began the chapter on Iraq, I was afraid I was in for another rant again, but I found myself in complete agreement with him as he said we can't completely identify who the insurgents in Iraq are, making it even more difficult to defeat them. I agreed with his suggestions for change in how personnel are distributed in the military and how promotions are awarded. But I disagree with the author that more Military Police units should be created from combat arms units. But this is a fundamental difference of opinion, because I also believe that there are real conventional threats still lurking, validating the importance of combat arms, and also that not all wars are 4GW. I don't believe it is that black and white. Operation Iraqi Freedom did not begin as a 4GW conflict, even though it would seem to have reached that point now. More Civil Affairs and Engineering units would help along with MPs. But to blindly sugget that the world has only 1 type of warfare is a bit naive, and we should staff our military to meet a hybrid version of 3GW and 4GW. But this book does a fantastic job of opening minds to see modern warfare from a completely different angle and I personally will highly recommend it.


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