Descartes' Bones: A Skeletal History of the Conflict Between Faith and Reason by Russell Shorto

From Barnes & Noble

A Selection of Barnes & Noble Recommends
This unconventional history justifies Jeffrey Toobin's description of it as "[a] compelling intellectual detective story, one that illuminates the present as much as the dusty past."

On a frigid February day in 1650, René Descartes was buried in the frozen ground of Stockholm, far from his French homeland. Sixteen years later, a French government official surreptitiously unearthed the philosopher's remains and returned them to the country of his birth. That, however, was only the beginning of the posthumous journeys of the man know as the Father of Philosophy. In this refreshingly heterodox history, Russell Shorto follows Descartes' bones over three centuries and six countries, showing how the battle over his body and most especially his skull exemplifies a far more significant war between faith and reason. Descartes' Bones deserves to be read by anyone who ever puzzled over mind/body problems.

From the Publisher

A New York Times Notable Book

Sixteen years after René Descartes' death in Stockholm in 1650, a pious French ambassador exhumed the remains of the controversial philosopher to transport them back to Paris. Thus began a 350-year saga that saw Descartes' bones traverse a continent, passing between kings, philosophers, poets, and painters.

But as Russell Shorto shows in this deeply engaging book, Descartes' bones also played a role in some of the most momentous episodes in history, which are also part of the philosopher's metaphorical remains: the birth of science, the rise of democracy, and the earliest debates between reason and faith. Descartes' Bones is a flesh-and-blood story about the battle between religion and rationalism that rages to this day.

The New York Times Book Review - Gary Rosen

Making the case for one or another historical moment as the starting point of modernity is a familiar hook for writers of grand chronicles…Russell Shorto's Descartes' Bones is a smart, elegantly written contribution to this genre. For Shorto, the pivot upon which the old world yielded to the new was the genius of Descartes, the philosopher who gave us the doubting, analytical, newly independent modern self. The Frenchman's most famous phrase, "I think, therefore I am," may strike our own ears as a coffee-mug cliche, but in the 17th century it was a revolutionary declaration. Shorto's achievement is to complicate this picture, and with it our understanding of modernity, by also describing the religious context of the philosopher's ideas.

The New York Times - Janet Maslin

Descartes' Bones has two favorite types of discourse: expanding on Descartes's place in the history of ideas and pointing out strange coincidences that shaped his path through posterity. These interests are so different that Descartes' Bones has built-in organizational problems. But Mr. Shorto leaps from one intriguing topic to another, doing it with verve if not consistency…Mr. Shorto is a rambling philosopher-reporter whose versatility can be more impressive than his coherence. But his insights are keen. And he is as drawn to great, overarching ideas as he is to historical factoids. Descartes' posthumous journey happens to be rich with both.

Publishers Weekly

At the center of this philosophical tale by the acclaimed author of The Island at the Center of the World is a simple mystery: Where in the world is Descartes's skull, and how did it get separated from the rest of his remains? Following the journey of the great 17th-century French thinker's bones-"over six countries, across three centuries, through three burials"-after his death in Stockholm in 1650, Shorto also follows the philosophical journey into "modernity" launched by Descartes's articulation of the mind-body problem. Shorto relates the life of the "self-centered, vainglorious, vindictive" Descartes and the bizarre story of his remains with infectious relish and stylistic grace, and his exploration of philosophical issues is probing. But the bones are too slender to bear the metaphorical weight of modernity that he gives them. Their sporadic appearance in the tale also makes them a shaky narrative frame for the sprawling events Shorto presents as the result of Descartes's work: the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, the 19th century's scientific explosion, 21st-century battles between faith and reason. Given Shorto's splendid storytelling gifts, this is a pleasure to read, but ultimately unsatisfying. (Oct. 14)

Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

David Keymer. Univ. of California - Library Journal

One might think that there is nothing new to be said about René Descartes, whose radical critique of scholastic thought underpins modern philosophy and opened the door to scientific skepticism. But Shorto (The Island at the Center of the World) has found an intriguing, albeit minor,new story to tell: the journey taken by Descartes's bones, from resting place to resting place and country to country, across three and a half centuries of modern (post-Cartesian) history. Are the shards and dust we know today as Descartes's indeed truly his? How does one explain the four separate skulls at one point ascribed to him? Descartes "believed he was building a wall around the fortress of faith," says Shorto, but his radical skepticism drastically limited the scope of faith and put it on the defensive. Shorto attempts to place the modern dialog between faith and reason in context, arguing that it is a dialog that neither side has won decisively. Though Shorto's musings on faith aren't as convincing as his unraveling of the unexpectedly complicated story of the successive reinterments of the French thinker, this is still a delightful book, and it plays fair by the rules of historical evidence. Warmly recommended for large public libraries and academic collections. [See Prepub Alert, LJ6/1/08.]

Kirkus Reviews

An oddly enjoyable excursus into Enlightenment history, courtesy of Rene Descartes's dismembered cadaver and pop-science/history writer Shorto (The Island at the Center of the World: The Epic Story of Dutch Manhattan and the Forgotten Colony that Shaped America, 2004, etc.). Descartes is remembered today-if at all, and if as more than a name-as a stuffy old guy who worried obsessively about how it was that he knew anything and whether he indeed existed. He hit on the fine formula that since he could think, he therefore was. But there's much more, and therein is the substance of Shorto's lively look at Cartesian dualism and its discontents. The conceit of the book is that poor Descartes, having been near-deified in life as a very smart fellow-"seen by many of his contemporaries as the man who laid the intellectual foundation for the whole modern program"-was subdivided on his death in 1650. He was partially reassembled some decades later when his remains were removed from Sweden, where he had died cursing his Dutch nemesis and attending physician with his last breaths, to France, where he couldn't make a living. That conceit worked for Michael Paterniti in regards to Einstein's brain in Driving Mr. Albert and Paul Collins seeking Paine's skeleton in The Trouble with Tom, but here it's mostly a peg on which to hang some thorny problems in Western philosophy. Do we think? Is there a ghost in the machine? What do we know? If we're so smart, why can't we live forever? (Some of Descartes's contemporaries, Shorto writes, refused to believe that the good doctor was mortal.) Descartes was short on confidently settled answers when he died, but, as Shorto writes, he had settled on two enemies:"authority . . . and fuzzy thinking." Considering what has followed, those seem good things to resist. Learning lightly worn but hard won; would that all philosophical history were so accessible. Agent: Anne Edelstein/Anne Edelstein Literary Agency

• Reading Group Guide
• Read an Excerpt

Reading Group Guide

1. Descartes' Bones opens with this quotation from Shakespeare's Richard II: "What can we bequeath save our deposed bodies to the ground?" In the context of what we learn in Descartes' Bones, what do you think this quote means? Why did the author choose it?

2. What do you think of the author's conversational writing style, how he weaves his experiences and opinion into the narrative? Did it enhance your reading experience?

3. Before reading Descartes' Bones, what meaning did Descartes' most famous saying, "I think, therefore I am," hold for you? Did it change now that you've read the book? How?

4. What is your definition of philosophy? Is there a particular philosopher to whose theories you subscribe? What do you think of Descartes' disproved theory of dualism? Can you understand why it was accepted for so long?

5. "Dr. Mennecier is what you would call a French intellectual. . . . To many people. . . . that would be considered a slur. . . . but the term can also encompass a way of looking at the world that is becoming sadly rare—call it a serious commitment to idiosyncrasy". How does Descartes embody this description by the author? What about the author himself? How would you describe someone with a "commitment to idiosyncrasy?" Is that a good or bad trait?

6. "The prevailing wisdom in neuroscience and philosophy is that Descartes was dead wrong. Mind and body—mind and brain—aren't fundamentally different at all." What do you make of this statement from the Preface, that such a revered figure in science such as Descartes was ultimately wrong? Does the fact thatdualism was debunked make you question the accuracy of Descartes' other teachings?

7. The author poses many questions about what he terms the "perennial conflict between faith and reason." To you, what comprises this dispute? Why has it persisted through centuries?

8. "[Descartes] wanted to reorient the way people thought". How are people influenced? Do you think it's really possible to alter the way a person actually thinks? If so, how would one go about doing so?

9. The author describes the great lengths to which opponents of Cartesianism went to prevent its ideas from being spread. Why was Cartesianism considered so dangerous?

10. "In the prevailing modern view, faith has no business meddling in astronomy or biology." Do you agree with this statement from Chapter Two? Considering debates like those between believers of Darwin's theory of evolution and those of intelligent design, how does religion factor into these ideas?

11. The author describes the saga of Descartes' bones as a metaphor for modernity. Do you agree with his characterization?

12. In Chapter Six the author explains his obsession with the tale of Descartes'' bones by stating that we as human beings "are all detectives" and "we crave closure." Do you agree? Why is the story of Descartes' bones so interesting to Russell Shorto, and to others? To paraphrase the book's descriptive copy, why should anyone care about the remains of one long-dead philosopher?

Read an Excerpt

THE MAN WHO DIED
IN THE SOUTHERN EDGE OF STOCKHOLM'S OLD Town stands a four-story building that was constructed during the busy, fussy period called the Baroque. Its red-brick facade is ornamented with sandstone cherubs and crests. Two upright cannons flank the entry; bearded busts gaze down sternly on those who approach the door. If you could somehow ignore the designer handbag shop and the upscale "Glenfiddich Warehouse" restaurant/bar occupying the ground floor, and the streams of tourists moving past on a summer afternoon, the structure would probably seem very much of the year--1630--when a merchant named Erik von der Linde built it.

In the dead of night in the dead of winter in the year 1650, the most solemn rite of passage was playing out on an upper floor of this building. People hurried between rooms, past windows that looked out onto the dark, icy harbor below, exchanging information and worried looks. But if the occasion was grave, it wasn't quiet. For someone close to death, the man who lay in bed--not quite fifty-four years old, small-boned, ashen, the center of everyone's attention--was alarmingly active. It was fury that gave him these last bursts of adrenaline. His friend and protege Pierre Chanut, the French ambassador to Sweden, in whose house he lay dying, was at his side constantly, trying to manage the man's anger while feeling doubly guilty: it was he who had urged Rene Descartes to come to this frozen land and he who had first contracted a fever, through which Descartes had nursed him before catching it himself.

Chanut fervently believed that Descartes was in the process of transforming the world with his revolutionarythinking. In this he was essentially correct. A change took place in the middle of the 1600s. People began to employ a new, sweeping kind of doubt, to question some of their most basic beliefs. The change was in a way more profound than the American and French revolutions, the Industrial Revolution, or the information age, because it underlay all of them and affected the very structure of people's thought--the way they perceived the world, the universe, and themselves in it. And the person most closely identified with this transformation was the man who lay dying in the Swedish winter. Pierre Chanut couldn't have known the scope of the future, but he knew, as did many others, that something staggeringly significant was afoot and that Descartes was at its center. It had by now dawned on the diplomat that, in bringing the philosopher here, he had unwittingly engineered a catastrophe.

The fever had given way to pneumonia; the patient's breath was ragged, his eyes wandering. Chanut had wanted to call the court physician, but Descartes raged against that idea. Finally, from her fairy tale palace on the other side of the small island in the harbor that was the center of Stockholm, Christina, the twenty-three-year-old queen of Sweden, who would go down as one of the more remarkable personalities in European history (there is, for starters, the centuries-old line of serious speculation that she was in fact a king), sent her physician to attend him. It was Christina who, with Chanut, had coaxed the intellectual celebrity northward in the first place.

The doctor, a Dutchman named Wullens, approached the bed reluctantly. There was a sharp exchange in which the philosopher made it venomously clear he thought the physician an ass. The encounter climaxed when Wullens proposed bloodletting, whereupon the patient erupted with a theatrical cry--"Gentlemen, spare French blood!"--and ordered the man out. Wullens departed, washing his hands of the business, muttering as he went a rather fatuous piece of consolation from the Roman poet Horace: "He who saves someone against his will does the same as to kill him."
The rage had two components. First, the philosopher had known Wullens during his long years in the Dutch provinces. One of the early public airings of Descartes' philosophy had come at Leiden University, and it caused an uproar among those who considered it a challenge to the whole system of education and thought that had been in existence throughout Europe for centuries. Wullens had stood with those who opposed the new philosophy. Descartes never forgot an enemy.

But there was another reason for the anger. In a peculiar way, much of Descartes' career had been a kind of chess match with death, and for a long time he had actually convinced himself that he had the upper hand. He had been a sickly child, with a pale complexion and a dry cough that he had inherited from his mother, who died when he was a year old. His father--a jurist and a man of power and ambition--seems to have despised the child's weakness and favored his older brother. The family doctors didn't bother to hide from the boy their conviction that he would die young.

When he was ten, however, Descartes was sent off to the Jesuit college of La Fleche in Anjou, one of the finest educational establishments in Europe. There, to his surprise, he flourished. He became strong, healthy, vigorous, aware of the wider world, and hungry for knowledge. But the early experience remained lodged inside him. When he settled into his mature work, medicine became its central focus. He developed his revolutionary philosophy, with its grounding not in the Bible or ancient writers but in human reason, and became famous and infamous for it. But the heart of it, the deep reason for it, was his desire to solve the puzzle of the body, to cure disease, and to lengthen human life--including his own. At the end of the Discourse on the Method, his epoch-changing work of philosophy, he vowed to the reader not that in the future he would craft a revised metaphysics or a new approach to mathematics but that he would "devote what time I may still have to live to no other occupation than that of endeavoring to acquire some knowledge of Nature, which shall be of such a kind as to enable us therefrom to deduce rules in medicine of greater certainty than those in present use." Five years before he lay dying in Sweden he wrote to an English earl, "The preservation of health has always been the principal end of my studies."

The same goal was in the minds of many of his contemporaries. When we think of science and the spark of modernity, we tend to think of astronomy: Galileo crafting his telescopes and peering into the skies above central Italy; locating sunspots, moons around Jupiter, craters on the earth's moon, and other irregularities in a universe that the church had taught was perfect; amassing data that corroborated the theory that the earth revolves around the sun; encountering the systematic wrath of the Inquisition. In our perennial effort to understand who we are and what it means that we are "modern," we choose astronomy as a starting point in part because it provides a sturdy metaphorical peg for thinking of the massive change that humanity underwent in the seventeenth century, when we--seemingly--left our mythic, biblical selves behind and reoriented ourselves in the cosmos. In 1957--the year of Sputnik and the dawning of the space age, a time when people had a simpler, clearer sense of "modern" than they do today and felt ready to embrace what they thought the word meant--a best-selling book expressed this idea in its title: the change was "From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe."

But one could just as easily see modernity springing from the intense interest in the human body that arose in Europe at the same time. If our place in the universe is an elemental marker of who we think we are, our physical being is something more. The magnitude of human suffering down the centuries is somewhat quantifiable. The life expectancy of a child born in Descartes' France was twenty-eight; in England between 1540 and 1800 it was an estimated thirty-seven. Similar rates--in the twenties and thirties--held for high-born citizens of ancient Rome, forager societies in Africa and South America, and people in rural India and China into the early twentieth century. More than half of all children born in London around the time of the American Revolution could be expected to die by age fifteen. And most deaths in early modern Europe were caused not by war or marauding brigands but by disease. Century upon century, hour after desperate hour, parents watched helplessly as their children succumbed to maladies whose very names--ague, apoplexy, flux, dropsy, commotion, consumption--spoke of the misty ignorance that was a definitive sentence.

The mists have lifted somewhat in three and a half centuries--we live longer and healthier lives--and still the body remains a touchstone of modernity. Zoloft, Lipitor, Viagra, Botox, ibuprofen, angioplasty, insulin, birth control pills, hormone replacement therapy, anabolic steroids--we don't merely allow science and technology into our physical beings but insist that they continually do more to better manipulate and aid the brute facts of our flesh and blood and bone selves. Embedded in this outlook is an idea of the body as a machine, so that illness is seen as a breakdown of the machine, healing involves repairing the broken parts, and a doctor is a kind of mechanic with medications as his or her tools. This simplistic view has been changing in the last twenty or thirty years. We have a hankering now to see mind and body as deeply connected, to appreciate the way thoughts and the environment influence our physical being. Yet the mechanical model has been very successful, and our medicine is still largely constructed around it. And it was this model that came into being in Descartes' generation.

This new way of viewing the human body was bewildering when it was first aired. Many people, in fact, equated it with atheism. It was frankly at odds with the overall approach to knowledge in the period against which modernity arose. Aristotelianism, or Scholasticism, was a blend of Christian theology and thinking derived from Aristotle and other ancient Greeks. These streams of thought had stewed together for centuries and resulted in a worldview that, often spiced with astrology and folklore, treated every subject under the sun, from the story of creation to the roles of men and women. It explained why a stone dropped from a window fell to the earth rather than floating upward (because objects want to move toward the center of the earth, which is the center of the universe); it told what happened when you died; it gave an account of the end of all things.

The premodern medical establishment--which Descartes had dedicated himself to overthrowing--was built around the teachings of the ancient Greek physician Galen, whose work in turn was dependent on Aristotle's division of the physical world into the four elements of earth, air, fire, and water. Corresponding to these were the bodily "humors," or fluids: blood, phlegm, black bile, and yellow bile. Diseases and disorders were seen as the result of a humoral imbalance. This system--augmented by folk medicine, witchcraft, Christianity, and astrology--had the advantage of completeness. My body and its little world of concerns--toothaches and fevers, lovesickness and moodiness--was part of the wide world and the wider universe. This doesn't mean that the view was that the body was made of the same material as everything else in the universe or that physical forces controlled everything. The ineffable was a genuine and necessary part of reality. Jesus walked on water; miracles happened; the Devil stalked the land. The supernatural--magic--existed within the natural; it was woven into the fabric of the world and the stars, including the sinews of the human body.

At the same time, the system was practical. As a physician in ancient Rome (with a list of clients that ran from Marcus Aurelius to gladiators), Galen himself had favored close observation of the patient--he was the first to recognize the pulse rate as an indicator of health--so that his approach had much to offer it, which explains why it endured for so long. One problem was that the underlying account of the physical world--Aristotle's four elements, which combined in different ways to create all the stuff of reality, from mountains to lily pads to manatees to earwax--did not serve as an especially sturdy foundation. Diagnosis and treatment via the system of humors--a melancholic, or "earthy," illness called for an "airy" compound, and so on--were dodgy if not lethal, as patients well knew and as Moliere, for whom the medical profession was a favorite target, suggested with the observation "most men die of their remedies and not of their diseases."

And that was establishment medicine. There were many other options that were considered valid. A sufferer from fever or stomach pain or gout or nosebleed might get, by way of professional service, an astrological reading, an amulet to be tied around the neck with a ribbon, or a squinty examination of his or her urine ("uroscopy" was looked to as a general indicator of health, as when Shakespeare's Falstaff asks a page, "What says the doctor to my water?"). The person administering the attention might be a physician, but astrologers and other sorts of healers were often seen as on a par, and some of the most esteemed medical men, including members of the College of Physicians in London, used astrology as part of their diagnostic tool kit.

Often, the caregiver was a clergyman. In any event, the procedure would have a religious cast. Illness and health were almost universally related to being in or out of God's sight, and the language of healing was shot through with theology. It was commonly held that medicine would work only if a prayer was offered to unlock its powers. Relying on physical remedies alone was often seen as downright ungodly: in England, Puritan minister John Sym advised "caution" that people "dote not upon, nor trust, or ascribe too much to physical means; but that we carefully look and pray to God for a blessing by the warrantable use of them." To do otherwise--to rely on a physic or powder alone--would be to put the material above the spiritual. That was why a strictly mechanical approach to medicine was considered dangerously atheistic.

Now, it must be said that millions if not billions of people around the world today subscribe to beliefs similar to those of Sym: that the physical and the spiritual--pills and prayers, as it were--are both necessary components to health. They visit specialists and get diagnostic screenings, and at the same time they meditate and pray and ask God for a miracle cure. And these people don't exactly inhabit the inner recesses of the rain forest; they live modern lives. They are us.
What's more, in the seventeenth century it wasn't only the premodern Aristotelians who held such views; so, for the most part, did the first generation of modern philosopher-scientists who reacted against them. So, too, did Descartes, who seems to have been as devout a Catholic as anyone of his time and whose whole mechanical account of the universe depended on God to hold it in place. The main challenge in following the story of Descartes' bones would seem to be understanding exactly what "modern" is. If it means a hard divide between the material and the spiritual, how do we account for the fact that both people of the seventeenth century who brought the modern sensibility into being and people today have managed to bridge this divide? We associate modern with a nonreligious, nonspiritual, purely rational and scientific outlook. Are we wrong to think that? If so, if it's a false divide, how did it come into being?

A partial answer is that when, in the early seventeenth century, the premodern worldview built around the received wisdom of the Bible and selected ancient writers began to come apart, and as dissatisfaction with it led to a conviction that the mind's latent strength could be brought to bear in radically new ways on the body's weakness, an inevitable result of the new approach was to give greater importance to the physical world and thus, however unintentionally, to devalue theological interpretations. Experimentation was not actually discovered by Francis Bacon in the early seventeenth century, but what Bacon promoted in his Novum Organum, which was published in 1620, was a commitment to reasoning based on observation of the natural world.


From the Hardcover edition.