War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars by Richard N. Haass

From the Publisher

A high-level cabinet officer in both Bush I and II defends the first (necessary) Iraq war and faults the second as flawed, unnecessary.

The New York Times - Geoffrey Wheatcroft

it sometimes seems that the books dealing with Iraq will outnumber those on both world wars. But if there has to be one more, few people are better equipped to write it than Haass, and especially to "compare and contrast," as exam papers say, the Persian Gulf war of 1991 and the Iraq war that began in 2003.

Publishers Weekly

Haass (The Opportunity), president of the Council on Foreign Relations and a former adviser to Secretary of State Colin Powell, offers a combination of memoir and analysis on two wars that, he says, began in 1990: Desert Storm, the response to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Haass describes Saddam's attack on Kuwait as undertaken in the face of U.S. efforts to persuade him to stand down. The 2003 war emerges as a consequence of 9/11, a "radical" initiative to oust Saddam and restructure the Middle East. In a pattern common to senior advisers without ultimate responsibility for decisions, Haass repeatedly describes perceptive memoranda ignored and perceptive insights rejected by those at the levers of power. He claims neither prescience nor precognition. Instead he presents himself as a realist and a moderate, preferring diplomacy to force while recognizing the necessary synergy of soft and hard power. Haass concludes that the first war succeeded because its limited aims were accomplished: Iraq was defeated and Kuwait's sovereignty restored. Whether or not Iraq eventually stabilizes, the second war ultimately failed because it was neither necessary, desirable nor just. Bungled execution only highlighted the waste of finite moral and material resources. Wars of choice are not inevitably mistaken, Haass concludes, but they are best avoided. (May)

Nader Entessar - Library Journal

Having served several U.S. administrations in high-level foreign policy positions for over two decades, Haass (The Opportunity), president of the Council on Foreign Relations, arguably the most influential foreign policy think tank in the United States, is uniquely qualified to provide readers with foreign policy insights and analysis. In this book, he compares, from both personal and historical perspectives, the U.S. decision-making process during two wars launched against Iraq. Haass was on the Security Council staff during George H.W. Bush's war, and he was director of policy planning in George W. Bush's State Department. As Haass persuasively argues, the first Iraq War was launched by a broad coalition of countries to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait and is described by Haass as an example of a classic war of collective self-defense, or a war of necessity. The second Iraq conflict, which was launched by the United States in 2003, was a war of choice because it was a preemptive war that ignored viable alternatives to war. Haass also addresses broader issues and forces that continue to affect the making and conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Recommended for all readers interested in U.S. foreign policy.

Kirkus Reviews

A former member of both Bush administrations compares the two Iraq wars. Now the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, Haass (The Opportunity: America's Moment to Alter History's Course, 2005, etc.) is one of a very select group-which includes Colin Powell, Dick Cheney, Bob Gates and Paul Wolfowitz-that was involved in making high-level decisions in both major Iraq conflicts. Haass makes the case that the 1991 war, spurred by Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, was a necessary and well-planned operation. The current Iraq conflict, he says, was a poorly executed war of choice. Haass backs up his assertions with firsthand knowledge. He was in the room when many of the initial plans were hashed out, for example, and he was standing next to Bush I when he famously said, "This will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait." Bush I's foreign policy was of a more practical, "realist" bent, the author argues, and its aims during the first conflict were concerned with reestablishing the status quo in the region. Bush II and his circle, on the other hand, had much more ambitious, difficult and dangerous goals: They wanted to truly transform the Middle East, and do it in one bold stroke. Haass admires then-Secretary of State Powell for his caution during the 2003 rush to war, but it's clear that Powell's (and Haass's) push for a more diplomatic approach with Iraq had few advocates in Bush II's inner circle. The result, he argues, was slipshod war planning. Haass also astutely notes the two presidents' differing management styles. While Bush I welcomed rigorous and inclusive policy debate, Bush II was far less careful and more informal, which, Haass argues, led to disastrous postwaroversight in Iraq. A unique perspective on how war policy was formed by two very different presidents. Agent: Esther Newberg/ICM

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