The Political Economy of Trust by Henry Farrell: Book Cover

    The Political Economy of Trust: Institutions, Interests and Inter-Firm Cooperation in Italy and Germany by Henry Farrell

    BUY IT NEW

    • $85.00 Online Price
      $68.00 Member price
      (Save 20%)
      Limited Time Offer! Everyone receives the Member Price on books.
      See Details
    • skip to cart
    • Add To List uiAction=GetAllLists&page=List&pageType=list&ean=9780521886499&productCode=BK&maxCount=100&threshold=3

    GET FREE SHIPPING ON ORDERS OF $25 OR MORE

    DELIVERY & GIFT DETAILS:

    Usually ships within 24 hours

    Delivery Time and Shipping Rates

    Eligible for gift wrap & gift message.

    BUY IT USED

    8 copies from $42.50

    See All Available

    (Hardcover)

    • Pub. Date: August 2009
    • 256pp
    • Sales Rank: 652,994
      Buy it Used: 8 copies from $42.50 See All Available

      Customers who bought this also bought

       
      • Overview
      • Editorial Reviews

      Product Details

      • Pub. Date: August 2009
      • Publisher: Cambridge University Press
      • Format: Hardcover, 256pp
      • Sales Rank: 652,994

      Synopsis

      Trust and cooperation are at the heart of the two most important approaches to comparative politics - rational choice and political culture. Yet we know little about the relationship of trust to political institutions. This book sets out a rationalist theory of how informal institutions can affect trust without reducing it to fully determined expectations. It then shows how this theory can be applied to comparative political economy, in particular to explaining inter-firm cooperation in industrial districts, geographical areas of intense small firm collaboration. The book compares trust and cooperation in two prominent districts in the literature, Emilia-Romagna, Italy, and Baden-Wurttemberg, Germany. It also sets out and applies a theory of how national informal institutions may change as a result of changes in global markets, and it shows how similar mechanisms may explain persistent distrust among Sicilian mafiosi.

      Customer Reviews

      • Reader Rating:
      Be the first to write a review!