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The Washington Post - Eliot A. Cohen

…this brilliant young scholar of the Vietnam War reminds us that it takes a special kind of soldier—reflective, patient, creative—to lead counterinsurgency operations.

Books and Culture

“Moyar is a true pioneer in a field whose importance for national security has been accepted only reluctantly and belatedly by the American public. . . . Now we have a vastly improved roadmap for guidance.”-- John Tierney, Books and Culture

— John Tierney

Wilson Quarterly

“A Question of Command stands out because it reaches back quite far, and to unexpected destinations.” —Wilson Quarterly

Washington Post

"[This] brilliant young scholar of the Vietnam War reminds us that it takes a special kind of soldier—reflective, patient, creative—to lead counterinsurgency operations."—Eliot A. Cohen, The Washington Post

— Eliot A. Cohen

New Yorker

“Terrorism, uniquely horrifying as it is, doesn’t belong to an entirely separate and containable realm of human experience, like the one occupied by serial killers. Instead, it’s a tactic whose aims bleed into the larger, endless struggle of people to control land, set up governments, and exercise power. History is about managing that struggle.”--Nicholas Lemann, The New Yorker

— Nicholas Lemann

ABC News

“Moyar''s study of Vietnam--Triumph Forsaken--is becoming a classic in counterinsurgency circles. His new case studies--A Question of Command--are making it to the desks of top military decision makers.”--George Stephanopoulos, ABC News

— George Stephanopoulos

Library Journal

Moyar (national security affairs, U.S. Marine Corps. Univ.) offers an insightful revisionist look at counterinsurgency, drawing lessons from the Iraq War. It has previously been maintained that the key to defeating insurgents was to "win the hearts and minds" of the local populations. Moyar contends that the level of success in counterinsurgency is consistent with the quality of unit leadership. Arguing that counterinsurgency should not be population-centric warfare but leader-centric warfare, he cites several case studies, covering over 100 years of military history. His chapters on the Philippine Insurrection of 1899 are especially potent, with other excellent examples including the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines and the Malaya Emergency, two post-World War II episodes. Essential reading for students of military history and anyone interested in what can be learned from the current fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan.