
Reserve it at BN.com & pick it up in 60 minutes at your local store.
Enter a zip code
Textbook (Paperback - New Edition)
Textbook Information
| More Formats | |
|---|---|
| Hardcover | $24.95 |
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders.
Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives.
This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
More Reviews and RecommendationsLucian Bebchuk is Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance and Director of Program on Corporate Governance at Harvard Law School.
Jesse Fried is Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Berkeley Center for Law, Business, and the Economy at the University of California, Berkeley.
Reader Rating:
See Detailed Ratings
August 18, 2009: The authors do a thorough job of limning how severe flaws in corporate governance have allowed corporate CEOs to reap huge financial benefits without any relationship to their performance. Corporate boards bear much of the blame as they have failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they employ. Executives' unchecked influence over their own compensation has redounded to the detriment of shareholders in numerous ways. Sound ideas for restoring corporate integrity are also discussed.
I Also Recommend: Let My People Go Surfing.