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"Not all racial incidents are racist incidents," Lawrence Blum says. "We need a more varied and nuanced moral vocabulary for talking about the arena of race. We should not be faced with a choice of 'racism' or nothing." Use of the word "racism" is pervasive: An article about the NAACP's criticism of television networks for casting too few "minority" actors in lead roles asks, "Is television a racist institution?" A white girl in Virginia says it is racist for her African-American teacher to wear African attire.
Blum argues that a growing tendency to castigate as "racism" everything that goes wrong in the racial domain reduces the term's power to evoke moral outrage. In "I'm Not a Racist, But...", Blum develops a historically grounded account of "racism" as the deeply morally charged notion it has become. He addresses the question whether people of color can be racist, defines types of racism, and identifies debased and inappropriate usages of the term. Though racial insensitivity, racial anxiety, racial ignorance and racial injustice are, in his view, not "racism," they are racial ills that should elicit moral concern.
Blum argues that "race" itself, even when not serving distinct racial malfeasance, is a morally destructive idea, implying moral distance and unequal worth. History and genetic science reveal both the avoidability and the falsity of the idea of race. Blum argues that we can give up the idea of race, but must recognize that racial groups' historical and social experience has been shaped by having been treated as if they were races.
Media, politicians, social and political groups and individuals use the term "racism" casually and inaccurately, thereby stripping the concept of its meaning, argues Lawrence Blum in I'm Not a Racist, But...: The Moral Quandary of Race. Not all interracial difficulties involve racism, he contends, but society does not have the vocabulary to discuss racial overtones with greater subtlety. Thus people and institutions fearful of being called racist feel defensive when racial issues are raised, perpetuating the status quo of race relations. Blum (Moral Perception and Particularity), professor of philosophy and of liberal arts and education at the University of Massachusetts, Boston, asserts that only "certain especially serious moral failings and violations" merit the designation "racism." Discussing various scholarly perspectives on the construction of racial categories, Blum calls for a balance between "ridding ourselves of the myth of race" and understanding the role of race in social inequality and in history. (Feb.) Copyright 2001 Cahners Business Information.
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