Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan by Ronald H. Spector

A reviewerby Anonymous

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November 13, 2007: Ronald Spector provides a combined summary history with very capable critical analysis of every major campaign between America and Japan during World War II. The strategic analysis is what really sets Spector's book apart from other Pacific War histories. For both Japan and the US, he examines and carefully critiques pre-war thinking, pre-war contingency plans, military organization, strategy, and tactics. The conclusion Spector comes to is one well known to chess fans - the side which makes the fewest mistakes wins. While Spector admits the final outcome of the war was largely a forgone conclusion (due to American industrial might and desire for vengeance after Pearl Harbor), he correctly concludes that the war in the Pacific could have been ended significantly earlier than it actually did - and with a reduced cost in human life. For example, Allied resources in the Pacific were constantly split between the Central Pacific (swiftest and shortest path to Japan) and the Southwest Pacific Commands (under politically powerful MacArthur). This dispersion of effort often came dangerously close to disaster, most notably in the Leyte Gulf battle. However, the Americans did rapidly develop new tactics and organizational capabilities, while Japanese military tactics mostly stagnated and ultimately relied on hopeless suicide tactics. Spector also evaluates the competency of the key individual commanders, with many American stars (e.g. Nimitz, Turner, Mitscher, Holland Smith) and a few Japanese ones (Yamamoto, Yamashita, and Kuribayashi). He deflates the myth of MacArthur being a 'great commander' and exposes him as mostly a publicity-seeking political general. Spector wraps up with a discussion of dropping the atomic bomb and whether or not it was the right decision. Basically, he states that although most people nowadays feel this was decision was morally wrong, it is difficult to fault the American decision-makers at the time. The US and Japan were fighting a knockdown-dragout war to the death, which was started by a sneak attack, being conducted by a Japanese military that had no value for human life, with a prospect of MILLIONS more lives being lost in the invasion of Japan proper. For the American serviceman, Truman essentially gave these millions (both Japanese and American) a death reprieve at the cost of 250,000 Japanese casualties. Horrific and cold, yes. But, ultimately the least costly human outcome possible to end the war. This is an outstanding book, packed with thoughtful analysis and carefully researched. I hightly recommend it!