- Shopping Bag ( 0 items )
- Spend $25, Get FREE SHIPPING
List Price
$43.00
Textbook Details
Used & New From our Trusted Marketplace Sellers
To try again, please visit the B&N Marketplace.
Reilly analyzes the design of electoral systems for divided societies, examining various divided societies which utilize "vote-pooling" electoral systemsincluding Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland and Fiji. He shows that political institutions which encourage the development of broad-based, aggregative political parties and where campaigning politicians have incentives to attract votes from a range of ethnic groups can, under certain conditions, encourage a moderate, accommodatory political competition and thus influence the trajectory of democratization in transitional states. This is a challenge to orthodox approaches to democracy and conflict management.
| List of illustrations | ||
| List of tables | ||
| Acknowledgements | ||
| List of abbreviations | ||
| 1 | Introduction: democracy in divided societies | 1 |
| 2 | The historical development of preferential voting | 27 |
| 3 | Centripetal incentives and political engineering in Australia | 42 |
| 4 | The rise and fall of centripetalism in Papua New Guinea | 58 |
| 5 | Electoral engineering and conflict management in divided societies (I): Fiji and Sri Lanka compared | 95 |
| 6 | Electoral engineering and conflict management in divided societies (II): Northern Ireland, Estonia and beyond | 129 |
| 7 | Technical variations and the theory of preference voting | 149 |
| 8 | Conclusion: assessing the evidence | 167 |
| References | 194 | |
| Index | 215 |
To try again, please visit the B&N Marketplace.



