Castles, Battles, and Bombs: How Economics Explains Military History by Jurgen Brauer, Hubert P. Van Tuyll

List of Figures and Tables     xi
Preface     xiii
Economics     1
Economics     6
Opportunity Cost     11
Expected Marginal Costs and Benefits     15
Substitution     20
Diminishing Marginal Returns     24
Asymmetric Information and Hidden Characteristics     27
Hidden Actions and Incentive Alignments     33
Conclusion: Economics-and Military History     39
The High Middle Ages, 1000-1300: The Case of the Medieval Castle and the Opportunity Cost of Warfare     45
Opportunity Cost and Warfare     49
The Ubiquity of Castles     51
The Cost of Castling     53
The Advantages of Castles     59
The Cost of Armies     66
Castle Building and the Other Principles of Economics     72
Conclusion     76
The Renaissance, 1300-1600: The Case of the Condottieri and the Military Labor Market     80
The Principal-Agent Problem     83
Demand, Supply, and Recruitment     85
Contracts and Pay     89
Control and Contract Evolution     100
The Development of Permanent Armies     104
Condottieri and the Other Principles ofEconomics     114
Conclusion     117
The Age of Battle, 1618-1815: The Case of Costs, Benefits, and the Decision to Offer Battle     119
Expected Marginal Costs and Benefits of Battle     122
The 1600s: Gustavus Adolphus and Raimondo de Montecuccoli     127
The 1700s: Marlborough, de Saxe, and Frederick the Great     137
Napoleonic Warfare     147
The Age of Battle and the Other Principles of Economics     154
Conclusion     157
The Age of Revolution, 1789-1914: The Case of the American Civil War and the Economics of Information Asymmetry     159
Information and Warfare     163
North, South, and the Search for Information     165
Major Eastern Campaigns through Gettysburg     168
Grant in Virginia     181
The American Civil War and the Other Principles of Economics     190
Conclusion     194
The Age of the World Wars, 1914-1945: The Case of Diminishing Marginal Returns to the Strategic Bombing of Germany in World War II     197
A Strategic Bombing Production Function     201
Bombing German War Production     207
Bombing the Supply Chain and the Civilian Economy     213
Bombing German Morale     219
Assessing the Effect of Strategic Bombing     224
Strategic Bombing and the Other Principles of Economics     227
Conclusion     235
The Age of the Cold War, 1945-1991: The Case of Capital-Labor Substitution and France's Force de Frappe     244
History of the Force de Frappe     248
The Force Post-De Gaulle     257
Justifying the Force     260
The Force's Effect on France's Conventional Arms     267
Substituting Nuclear for Conventional Forces     272
The Force de Frappe and the Other Principles of Economics     282
Conclusion     285
Economics and Military History in the Twenty-first Century     287
Economics of Terrorism     289
Economics of Military Manpower     298
Economics of Private Military Companies     307
Economics, Historiography, and Military History     319
Conclusion     322
Notes     329
References     367
Index     387