Atomic Tragedy: Henry L. Stimson and the Decision to use the Bomb Against Japan by Sean L. Malloy

From the Publisher

Atomic Tragedy offers a unique perspective on one of the most important events of the twentieth century. As secretary of war during World War II, Henry L. Stimson (1867-1950) oversaw the American nuclear weapons program. In a book about how an experienced, principled man faltered when confronted by the tremendous challenge posed by the intersection of war, diplomacy, and technology, Sean L. Malloy examines Stimson's struggle to reconcile his responsibility for "the most terrible weapon ever known in human history" with his long-standing convictions about war and morality.

Ultimately, Stimson's story is one of failure; despite his beliefs, Stimson reluctantly acquiesced in the use of the atomic bomb against heavily populated Japanese cities in August 1945. This is the first biography of Stimson to benefit from extensive use of papers relating to the Manhattan Project; Malloy has also uncovered evidence illustrating the origins of Stimson's commitment to eliminating or refining the conduct of war against civilians, information that makes clear the agony of Stimson's dilemma.

The ultimate aim of Atomic Tragedy is not only to contribute to a greater historical understanding of the first use of nuclear weapons but also to offer lessons from the decision-making process during the years 1940-1945 that are applicable to the current world environment. As the United States mobilizes scientists and engineers to build new and supposedly more "usable" nuclear weapons and as nations in Asia and the Middle East are replicating the feat of the Manhattan Project physicists at Los Alamos, it is more important than ever that policymakers and analysts recognize the chain of failures surrounding thefirst use of those weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Ed Goedeken - Library Journal

These two new books provide important perspectives on the continuing debate about the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, which ultimately concluded the war in the Pacific and World War II. Were these bombings necessary? Rotter's well-written narrative looks at the development of the bomb from an international standpoint and recounts the vigorous competition between the Allies and the Axis powers to come up with an effective atomic weapon that could be used to turn the tide of war. Going beyond the accounts found in such classics as Richard Rhodes's The Making of the Atomic Bomb, Rotter delves into the complex personalities of the numerous military, political, and scientific leaders who were engaged in this enterprise. In so doing, he creates the context-both in military and in diplomatic terms-that led the Americans to use the bomb on the two unsuspecting Japanese cities.

Malloy's study of Henry L. Stimson, who served as secretary of war during World War II, is equally valuable. Stimson, who was in his seventies during the war, was one of the Republican Party's most respected elder statesmen, having been in Hoover's and Taft's cabinets before. He was a deeply moral man who believed in the rule of law to keep international order. Yet despite his fervent belief in moral suasion, he succumbed to the allure of the atomic bomb-and all its attendant horrors-when presented with the possibility that the terrible war could be concluded through its use, even though at the expense of civilian life. Malloy's book, which builds on earlier work by Hodgson (The Colonel) and Morison's classic Turmoil and Tradition, presents us with an updated and exceedinglyinsightful assessment of the aging statesman, perhaps no longer at the top of his game yet faced with one of our country's most challenging decisions during its most awful conflict. Malloy believes Stimson's decision to support the bomb went against his most cherished beliefs and was for many a disappointing conclusion to an outstanding career of public service. Both of these works are highly recommended for all collections.

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