Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War by Chris Bellamy

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  • Pub. Date: October 2007
  • 848pp

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    Product Details

    • Pub. Date: October 2007
    • Publisher: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group
    • Format: Hardcover, 848pp

    Synopsis

    The battle on the Eastern Front between 1941 and 1945 was arguably the single most decisive factor of World War II, fixing the course of world history over the next half century. Now, drawing on sources newly available since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany, historian and journalist Chris Bellamy presents the first full account of this deadly conflict.

    Bellamy outlines the lead-up to the war—in which the fragile alliance between Hitler and Stalin was unceremoniously broken—and takes us headlong into the hostilities. He presents a shocking picture of battle in which the traditional restraints of “civilized” warfare were shed. He makes clear how the Soviets quickly rallied against Hitler, choosing homegrown despotism over foreign domination in a struggle that the Russian people call the Great Patriotic War.

    Bellamy charts the early gains of the German army, whose advances into Soviet territory were brought to a halt in Moscow in the winter of 1941, and whose defeat was sealed in the Battle of Stalingrad, the most merciless campaign of the bloodiest front. He shows how Soviet men—and women—joined to fight a war whose casualties were later steeply underestimated by their government, and how even the true death toll, at 27 million, does not take into account the millions of lives on both sides that lay shattered in the aftermath.

    Finally, Bellamy examines the far-reaching consequences of the battle’s outcome—the reverberations of which are still felt today—and argues that the cost of victory was ultimately too much for the Soviet Union to bear.

    A magisterial study, and anessential addition to our understanding of contemporary world history.

    Harry Willems - Library Journal

    Using newly opened archives in Russia to dispel myths perpetuated by Stalin's enemies and even Stalin himself, Bellamy (military science & doctrine, Cranfield Univ.) transforms our understanding of Hitler's war against the Soviet Union. Essentially, Bellamy argues that Hitler did not dupe Stalin and that the Soviet Union was not caught napping when Germany invaded. Information pours from this extensive book at an astounding rate. Details about the agreement between Stalin and Hitler, for instance, and about Stalin's diplomatic discourses with Churchill and with U.S. envoys make this priority reading for World War II buffs and academics alike. One can follow the "reverse funnel" of German advances into Russia, the same route that Napoléon undertook 130 years earlier. Indeed, Bellamy draws parallels between the Patriotic War (1812) and the Great Patriotic War (1940): hundreds of divisions that overwhelmed the starting gate simply got lost on the ever widening landscape of Russia/the Soviet Union. Bellamy takes every opportunity to explain findings from newly available archives and show how they overturn long-standing theories. Recommended for academic and public libraries where interest in World War II is strong.

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    Biography

    Chris Bellamy is Professor of Military Science and Doctrine and Director of the Security Studies Institute at Cranfield University. Born in 1955, he was educated at the Universities of Oxford, London, Westminster, and Edinburgh. In 1990 he was appointed Defence Correspondent of The Independent, and served in that capacity for more than seven years, reporting from Saudi Arabia and Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War, from Bosnia between 1992 and 1997, and from Chechnya in 1995. He lives in London.

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    Fine study of the Soviet war effortby willyvan

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    October 23, 2009: Chris Bellamy, Professor of Military Science and Doctrine at Cranfield University, has written a thorough history of the war on the Eastern front. He judges that the Soviet Union's war with Finland "did achieve some territorial expansion, which may have saved Leningrad in 1941."

    Hitler's Chief of Staff, Colonel-General Franz Halder, called Soviet deployments in June 1941 'purely defensive'. Right up to the invasion, the British government thought that Germany was just using military pressure to intimidate the Soviet Union, and it expected more German demands, or an ultimatum, not an invasion.

    It was, as Bellamy points out, 'a totally unprovoked and unconditional attack'. Molotov said, "Our cause is just. The enemy will be beaten. Victory will be with us." In the first days, "German accounts are unanimous about the unexpected strength and savagery of the Soviet resistance across most of the front." As Halder said, the Red Army "simply do not know when they have been defeated."

    Bellamy applauds Stalin's key decision to shift 2,593 industrial enterprises east, 'probably his most crucial decision' and emphasises, "The hard definition of intellect. Priorities." He refutes Khrushchev's lies about Stalin's behaviour after the invasion, and details his demanding work schedule, commenting, "if anyone deserved a break, it was Stalin. But, it transpired, the country could not do without him."

    Germany's first great defeat was the Battle of Britain in 1940. The Battle of Smolensk July 1941 fatally delayed the German advance. Germany's first great defeat on land was the Battle of Moscow, September 1941-April 1942. Bellamy rates the Soviet counter-offensive at Stalingrad, Operation Uranus, in November 1942, as 'the greatest encirclement of all time'. He observes that Operation Bagration, in June 1944, "underlined a cardinal principle of war. The enemy's main forces must be the main objective. And the enemy's main force had been destroyed."

    Bellamy praises "the Russians' record of resilience, fighting spirit, tactical ingenuity and innovation, and operational and strategic leadership." He notes, "Without the tight political and security control exercised through and by the NKVD, neither Leningrad nor the whole country might have survived."

    He writes, "the socialist victory in the 1945 general election owed something to the upsurge of pro-Russian, and therefore, at that time, pro-communist - certainly socialist - feeling among the British people during the war. After all, the British people had faced the Germans alone for a year in 1940-41, and the Russians had held them and knocked them back, pretty well alone, apart from the limited support the western Allies could send, in 1941-2."

    I Also Recommend: Masters and Commanders, The Second World War, The Road to Berlin (Cassell Military Paperbacks Series), Road to Stalingrad, Stalin.