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(Paperback - REV)
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The critically acclaimed New York Times bestselling account of how the modern Middle East came into being after World War I, and why it is in upheaval today
In our time the Middle East has proven a battleground of rival religions, ideologies, nationalisms, and dynasties. All of these conflicts, including the hostilities between Arabs and Israelis that have flared yet again, come down, in a sense, to the extent to which the Middle East will continue to live with its political inheritance: the arrangements, unities, and divisions imposed upon the region by the Allies after the First World War.
In A Peace to End All Peace, David Fromkin reveals how and why the Allies came to remake the geography and politics of the Middle East, drawing lines on an empty map that eventually became the new countries of Iraq, Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon. Focusing on the formative years of 1914 to 1922, when all-even an alliance between Arab nationalism and Zionism-seemed possible he raises questions about what might have been done differently, and answers questions about why things were done as they were. The current battle for a Palestinian homeland has its roots in these events of 85 years ago.
This covers the creation of the modern Middle East from 1914 to 1922.
More Reviews and RecommendationsHistorian David Fromkin is a professor at Boston University and the author of several acclaimed books of nonfiction. He lives in New York City.
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Tortuous Destiny of Middle Eastern Tapestry
Serge Van Steenkiste
(sergevs@joimail.com)
, A reviewer, 02/28/2005
David Fromkin gives his readers a sweeping account of the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the birth of the contemporary Middle East, defined as Egypt, Israel, Iran, Turkey, the Arab states of Asia, Central Asia and Afghanistan (pg. 16). Fromkin mainly focuses on the decision-making process of Europeans and Americans who, between 1914 and 1922, determined the fate of the region without any input of its inhabitants (pg. 17, 400). The area that the much-diminished, anachronistic Ottoman Empire occupied in 1914 was one of the few territories that the European empires had not yet shared among themselves (pg. 24, 32). The European powers did not wait for the fall of the Ottomans before arguing about their respective zones of influence in the region after the war. Statesmen such as Lloyd George, Woodrow Wilson, Herbert Kitchener, T.E. Lawrence, Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin played leading roles in re-shaping the region. Winston Churchill - at times unintentionally - had the most enduring impact on its cartography (pg. 19, 25, 73, 385-388, 493-529, 558-567). After losing the patronage of Britain against Russia, the weakened Ottoman Empire, anxious to pursue its modernization while living in fear of Western powers' designs, convinced Germany to become its partner in 1914 (pg. 33-50, 75, 142). Fromkin convincingly demonstrates that Churchill was not to blame for pushing Turkey into the arms of Germany (pg. 54-76). Britain and allied powers believed that the Ottoman war would be a sideshow that could be easily managed (pg. 83, 115, 119-123) but they were repeatedly proven wrong (pg. 200-203, 215, 248, 289, 301). The poorly executed attack on Turkey at the Dardanelles could have considerably shortened the duration of the war (pg. 127, 264). Churchill was the scapegoat for the fiasco and was demoted within the government (pg. 128, 154, 159, 161-162, 233). After resigning and spending a few months in the wilderness, Churchill, who was perceived as dangerous across the board, was brought back to the government at the insistence of Lloyd George, the new British Prime Minister (pg. 166, 234, 265-266). Kitchener and his Lieutenants acting on his behalf in British Cairo imposed their design on government's policy towards the Middle East at the expense of the India Office (pg. 88-95, 106-110). Britain would rule the region indirectly after the fall of the Ottoman Empire (pg. 85). Like the French, Kitchener and his men wrongly assumed that the Moslem Middle East would be glad to be ruled by Christians (pg. 93-94, 102, 106). The British looked at Hussein, the Sherif of Mecca and its Emir, as the ideal candidate for the position of 'Pope' of Islam (pg. 105). The British leadership wrongly believed that Islam was a single entity and that temporal and spiritual authority could be easily split (pg. 96, 104). The Arabs misled the Allies about their true strength to fight the Ottoman Empire. This cost Britain dearly because their core competency was only guerilla warfare against the Turks, until the capture of Jerusalem (pg. 186-187, 219-222, 309, 313, 377-378, 396). Over time, the British became disillusioned with Hussein. However, they supported two of his sons in the fulfillment of their ambitions (pg. 326-329, 506-512). Britain entered into negotiations with France, Russia, and later Italy that ultimately resulted in the cursed Sykes-Picot-Sazanov agreement and other secret treaty understandings to share the spoils of victory in the Middle East (pg. 189-199, 267, 287, 330, 334-335, 342-344, 373-379, 391-402). The Allies had no intention to pay the price Hussein demanded for his support to the allied cause (pg. 186, 227); only lip service was paid in the field to the nominal pro-Arab independence policies of London during and after WWI (pg. 325, 345). The French and Russians showed similar contempt for Arab and Islamic aspirations of independence in the Middle East in the same period (pg. 378, 435-440, 463-490). Much to their dismay, the Americans discovered the existence of all the secret arrangements of the Allies to partition the region after the overthrow of Tsarist Russia in 1917. As Colonel House and Arthur Balfour presciently remarked, these imperialistic arrangements were sowing the seeds of future wars in the region (pg. 257, 400). Similarly, President Wilson predicted that peace would be illusory if its terms were not basically fair to all sides (pg. 399). To the surprise of some 21st century observers, British leaders in London first anticipated no negative reaction against the Balfour Declaration from their Arab Allies. Like some prominent Jews, they believed that there was no essential incompatibility between the Arab and Zionist ideals (pg. 283, 321, 324, 444, 519-520, 527). British leaders had seen France as their only obstacle (pg. 292-293, 297). The local British administration was to some extent supporting Arab violence against Jewish settlements. They sowed doubts about the feasibility of a Jewish homeland cut out of Palestine that was encompassing present Jordan, in the minds of some enthusiastic pro-Zionists (pg. 445-448, 504-505, 513-529). The uncompromising position of Amin-al-Husseini and his successors greatly harmed the Palestinian cause (pg. 517-518). Iraq was another British creation that has not shown much stability since its beginnings in the 1920s. The recently terminated Sunni Arab dominance over the other population groups has cast a long shadow over the inter-ethnic relationships in this fragile country (pg. 449-454, 503-506). Similarly, the French did not fully realize the risks when they carved Lebanon out of Syria and put the Maronite minority in charge of the new country. The marginalization of the predominantly Muslim population eventually led to the civil war in the 1970s and 1980s and later on to the ineffectual 'syrianization' of Lebanon (pg. 17, 439). Fromkin's book remains as relevant as ever to persons committed to the prosperity of the Middle East.
A great testimonial on elitist policies !
Richard S., A reviewer, 12/04/2004
Mr. Fromkin from the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and an expert on conflicts has written a marvelous book that thoroughly delineated the policies of the dominant powers in the early 1900s, which led to the creation of the modern Middle East. Mr. Fromkin discusses how the seeds of conflict were created by the colonial powers, in order to ensure their continuous dominance over the Middle East and its natural resources. This book subtly addresses the politics of discord creation, and the importance of well designed conflicts in attaining the desired results. Peace to end all peace is a great reading for the history buff who is interested in an elitist perspective.
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